Between Neutrality and Solidarity: Romanian Policy at the Onset of the Great Eastern Crisis (1875–1876)

Abstract

The paper analyzes how the Principality of Romania navigated between neutrality and solidarity with neighboring Christian peoples during the first phase of the Great Eastern Crisis, from the Herzegovina uprising in 1875 to the end of the First Serbian–Ottoman War in 1876. It argues that Romania practiced an “active neutrality,” combining diplomatic restraint with military and administrative measures to protect its security and prepare the ground for future independence. On the basis of diplomatic correspondence, circular notes, decrees, consular reports, and the contemporary press, the study reconstructs the evolution of Romanian policy from cautious observation to a more assertive defense of its interests. Foreign Minister Vasile Boerescu’s circular of 9 August 1875 codified Romania’s stance as a “passive but interested observer,” insisting on strict neutrality and good relations with the Porte, while openly acknowledging sympathy for Christian populations in Herzegovina, Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro. This formula reflected the fundamental dilemma of Romanian diplomacy: how to maintain an autonomous national policy distinct from that of its Balkan neighbors, despite strong emotional and political affinities. Neutrality, however, did not mean passivity. Prince Carol ordered large-scale maneuvers and troop concentrations along the Danube, signalling readiness and deterring potential violations of Romanian territory. The government issued detailed instructions to prefects and port captains to prevent the crossing of armed bands, volunteers, and war matériel, and set up commissions to control implementation, although enforcement remained uneven and episodes of Bulgarian and Russian activity on Romanian soil persisted. At the same time, Romanian newspapers articulated a programmatic vision that durable peace in the East required the creation of autonomous Christian states, linking Romanian historical experience with the ongoing struggles of Balkan Slavs. As war between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire became imminent, Foreign Minister Mihail Kogălniceanu attempted to use the crisis to obtain de facto recognition of Romanian independence, while Romanian diplomacy campaigned for the neutralization of the Danube to avoid being drawn into hostilities. After Serbian military setbacks and the formation of Ion Brătianu’s cabinet in July 1876, Bucharest tightened its neutral stance, restricting arms deliveries and volunteer transit despite Serbian pressure and the 1868 treaty. The paper concludes that the experience of 1875–1876 functioned as a transitional phase in Romanian foreign policy: from interested observer, through an actively neutral guardian of its own security, to a future independent actor ready to participate in reshaping the Balkan political map in 1877.